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dence has been presented to conﬁrm cause—effect linkages between speciﬁc persistent toxic
substances and speciﬁc adverse impacts in ﬁsh, birds, turtles and various mammals.


























































low contaminant concentrations and the potentially confounding factors.




















limitations to study design may exist, the Commission concluded that these did not neces—
sarily invalidate the ﬁndings and conclusions when considered in a weight of evidence con—




















justiﬁcation for the virtual elimination of the discharges of persistent toxic substances to the
Great Lakes.




















fore should be subject to the policy contained in the Great Lakes Water Qiality Agreement
concerning their virtual elimination.
The Commission continues work to better deﬁne what is meant by weight of evi-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































questions that are on my mind center around
such things as, and I hope you will all resolve

















































































































































































upon which to act?
even such evidence is more suspicion thanfact?























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































they suspect they may have such proof when the next generation reaches puberty, should
they not come forward with evidence they now have, even if such evidence is more suspi-
cion than fact? Is that something that we should talk about here today.> If not, then how
do we deal with preventive measures in the face of scientiﬁc uncertainty?
So, those are some of my questions and we have a panel here to give us their expert
view and their subject matter. The panel includes Mr. Glen Fox of the Canadian Wildlife
Service, discussing scientiﬁc principles; Dr. Joseph Jacobson of Wayne State University, who
will give results of his research on children of Great Lakes ﬁsh consumers; Professor
Margaret A. Berger, Brooklyn Law School, will discuss the implications of the Daubert case;
Dr. William Owens of Procter and Gamble Company will present research on the basis for
removing biologically active persistent toxic substances; Mr. Jack Weinberg of Greenpeace
will advocate the precautionary inference; and Dr. Rosalie Bertell of the International Insti—





We are all, with all the other biota in the Great Lakes ecosystem, unwitting subjects
in an unknown number of natural experiments. They are unknowingly initiated, and have
not been through the statistician’s ofﬁce for his input on design, they are not screened or
approved by an animal care or a medical ethics committee. At some later date, you or I, or
somebody we knowwill make some observation or an event will occur that will bring our
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































exposure to a critical factor and the incidence '






































































































bacco smoke that cause the problem. In 1964,
the U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory Commit-






































































































































































































































































































































































































The second is strength of the association and asks whether cause and effect coincide
in their distribution. Is the prevalence of the effect in the exposed populations large relative
to unexposed populations?
The third is specificity of the associations. Could the effect be due to a different
cause? Could the proposed cause produce other effects? Can alternate hypotheses be elimi-
nated? In the context of the Great Lakes, where a multiplicity of persistent toxic substances
and ecological perturbations are present, specificity may be complicated by chemical inter—
actions, commonality of the mode of action, and interspecific differences in the susceptibil—
ity of biota.
Consistency of the association is the fourth criterion. Has the association been re-
peatedly observed in different places, circumstances, times and species, or by other investi-
gators with different research designs?
And finally, coherence of the associations. Is the cause-effect interpretation consist—
ent with our current understanding of biological mechanism(s) underlying the effect? Is an
exposure—response relationship present? Do laboratory studies support the proposed rela—
tionship? Do remedial actions lead to altered frequency and severity of the effects? Only
biologically plausible associations can result in biological significance, however, judgments
on this basis are bound by our imperfect knowledge at any time.
Weighing the strength of evidence is always required. What is the nature of the evi-
dence that must be ignored to conclude that no causal relationship exists? What alternate
explanation will fit our observations and what other differences between our contrasted
groups could equally, or better account for the observed incidences? One of the fathers of
epidemiology, Sir Austin Bradford Hills, wrote that all scientific work is incomplete,
whether it is observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or modi-
fied by advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us the freedom to ignore the
knowledge that we already have, orto postpone the action it appears to demand at any
given time. Complete logical certainty is not available in science. The best we can do is
reach the most reasonable explanation based on the evidence at hand.
We have tried to apply these criteria to case studies on populations of fish, wildlife
and human health in the Great Lakes basin. In 1989 in Chicago, I presented these criteria
and a number of people then applied them to their data. These case studies and the criteria
were published in the August 1991 issue of the journal of Toxirology and Environmental
Healt/J as the proceedings of the First Cause—Effect Linkages Workshop. The Second
Cause—Effect Linkages Workshop was held in association with the 1991 Biennial Meeting
at Traverse City in Michigan where more data was presented. The proceedings of that
workshop were published in the December 1993 issue of the journal ofGreat Lakes Research.
More recently the Chlorine Institute contracted CANTOX to look into the issue of
whether or not there is a toxicological problem in the Great Lakes that might be related to
chlorine, and to elucidate the scientific principles for evaluating the potential for adverse ef-
fects of chlorinated organic chemicals. CANTOX, a very well—recognized toxicological
contract group, used these same criteria and proposed their use as an adequate way of ap-
proaching this question. So I think we are talking about something that has been tried and
tested.
Cause and effect associations which are epidemiologically consistent should be con-
ﬁrmed experimentally, if possible using extensions of Koch’s postulates for proving that the
particular pathogen causes a specific disease. First we would do an experiment with con-
trolled exposures of a susceptible organism to a concentration gradient of that chemical or
suspected agent, be it a complex efﬂuent or contaminated medium, that is associated with
the effect in the field. From those controlled exposures we would expect to find a related
gradient in the response. The second strategy is to show, from analysis of samples from field
 studies, that the organisms in the ﬁeld are exposed to the suspected contaminant or agent
and that the degree of exposure is consistent with the degree of exposure that causes the
effect in a laboratory animal.
Economically and practically, it is far easier to regulate contaminants at the source of
production, than to react after their release into the ecosystem. We should not wait for
damage to occur and then try to ﬁx the situation. Instead we should use appropriate strat-
egies to prevent the damage from occurring in the first place. In recent political discus-
sions in our two countries and at this 1993 IJC Biennial Meeting, we have repeatedly heard
our neighbours, our children, our constituents, our taxpayers, our board members and our
employees tell us that there must be a fundamental change in thinking of industry, govern—
ment and society. I think that ethical issues are too often subservient to legal and economic
issues. To protect human health we need to consider what is ethical rather than what is
legal or least expensive. We’ve talked a lot about protecting human health, but we also
have to protect biodiversity and the planet Earth and to do that we need to consider what
is ethical instead of what is permissible.
This change requires thathumankind recognizes its true place in relation to this
world. We are part of Nature, inseparable constituents of the ecosphere and that is a truth
that cannot be denied. One of my favourite thinkers in the field of modern ecology is Stan
Rowe from the University of Saskatchewan, who has written a wonderful book called Home
Place in which he has had a hard look at where the world is going and what it is we need
to do to realign our thinking to be more compatible with our continued existence on this
biosphere. Stan puts it this way, “Nature is where we come from and where we belong in
our earthly existence. Nature, (i.e. the ecosphere) is home, with responsibilities for care
and affection and aesthetic concern that the word ‘home’ implies. To be at home means
asking ourselves about our intentions of stay-
ing on, about care of the furnishings and their
maintenance, about sympathy for the other
occupants and their welfare. These are all
matters with powers to initiate fundamental
revolution in the practice of our arts and sci-
ences and in time becoming our second nature
as we prepare to minister to the natural home
place."
One of tbefatbers of epidemiology, Sir Austin
Bradford Hills, wrote tbat all scientiﬁc work is in—
complete, wbetber it is observational orexperimental.
All scientific work is liable to be upset or modiﬁed by
advancing knowledge. Tbat does not confer upon us
tbefreedom to ignore tbe knowledge tbat we already
bave, or to postpone tbe action it appears to demand
I think a paradigm shift like this will atanygim time-
affect our viewpointfrom which we assess the
weight of evidence. As a society we must de—
cide on the appropriate standards of proof for causality and the existence of adverse effects.
At the moment we have the cancer population standard, which is one case in one million.
There is a public health standard, which is one in 10,000 to one in 100. The doctor’s
standard is between onein 10, and one in a 100. The legal standard for proof of causality
is greater than 50%. The scientiﬁc standard is greater than 95%, which is biased towards
the prevention of “acceptance errors” rather than “rejection errors.” We must decide
whether to use one of these criterion or one that is based on ethics, knowledge, experience
and concern for the biosphere.
In environmental decisionmaking, it is preferable to have lots of data, but in the end
we have to use experience. Scientists have traditionally been obsessed with not being wrong
in reporting that some phenomenon Was occurring or that it was caused by some factor.
Contrary to present administrative practice, in environmental decisionmaking it would be
preferable to take action aimed at protecting or restoring a resource based on an erroneous
causal relationship than to delay the decision for one or two decades and thereby risk losing
the entire resource.
   
   
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DAUBERT CASE















































































































































































































































































































































































By the time the Daubert case -— which was a case coming out of the Ninth Circuit in
California -- had to be decided, there were all these other cases rejecting proof of causa—
tion. The trial judge in Daubert granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. In other
words, on the basis of afﬁdavits submitted by experts for the plaintiffs and the defendant,
the trial judge found that the defendant would not be able to succeed as a matter of law.
The case went up to the Ninth Circuit, the three-judge appellate court, which in a very
summary opinion by Judge Kozinski said: first, the appropriate standard to apply was the
“general acceptance” standard of what the scientific community agreed on, the so—called
Frye standard that came from a 1920 case dealing with lie detectors, and second, pursuant
to that standard, plaintiffs’ expert testimony wouldn’t have been admissible because it hadn’t
been peer reviewed. Therefore the Ninth Circuit concluded that it would throw the case
out and affirm the grant of summary judgment.
This went to the Supreme Court, probably in part because what the judge said in af-
firming was so much broader than what needed to be said to dispose of the case. By sug-
gesting that no scientific evidence would ever be admissible unless it had been peer reviewed
and by also suggesting that the only test was “general acceptance,” the judge was perhaps
overly broad in his analysis. Anyway, the Supreme Court took certiorari (a writ to call up
the records of an inferior court) and the case was argued before the Supreme Court. There
was enormous interest in the case and 22 amirus briefs were filed. Groups with an interest
in science, as well as members of the corporate bar, the plaintiff’s bar, and persons inter—
ested in issues of state versus federal law all somehow managed to find a basis for writing a
brief in Dauéert. I also wrote an arm'qu brief on behalf of the Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology and Government.
 Interestingly enough, by the time the case was actually argued in the Supreme Court,
and I was at the oral argument, neither side was arguing exactly those issues that the Su-
preme Court had certified for review. Neither side was really saying that all evidence that
is to be admitted has to be peer reviewed and neither side had a good word to say for the
Frye “general acceptance” test. What it really boiled down to between the plaintiffs and the
defendant was that the plaintiffs were saying: we have qualified experts. There is no con—
tention in this case that the experts were not qualified. They have perfectly valid degrees,
they have terrific CVs (curricula vitae), they all had experience in the fields in which they
purport to be experts. The plaintiffs were saying that once you have an expert like that, an '
expert with credentials, the court has to allow such an expert to testify. The defendants
were saying that’s not enough -- there has to be a foundational inquiry before a court will i
allow an expert witness to testify, an inquiry as to whether the expert has a theory that has
been sufficiently validated to be of assistance to the court in this case.
The result in Daubert was that the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary
judgment, meaning that the plaintiffs get another chance, but I do not think that the plain—
tiffs will ultimately succeed. The Supreme Court said that there is a “gatekeeping” function
for the federal judge —— that the judge must make a determination before the judge allows a
qualified expert to testify. Now that, of course, brings us to the crux of Daubert. What will
that determination consist of? What is it that the expert has to be able to say? Well this is
also where the court’s opinion gets a little vague and Daubert certainly is not the end of all
discussion on how a court makes this determination on the admissibility of scientiﬁc expert
testimony. You can’t have a magic formula for this kind of a case.
What I think is important are some of the things that the court acknowledged in the




















tific product and say, do I agree with the re-
sults? Do I now agree that Bendectin does or
does not cause birth defects? Rather, the
judge should seek to ascertain whether the
Tbis went to tbe Supreme Court, probably in part be-





























































































tific method? A court must at least be able to
see, if the expert is claiming that tests reveal
such and such, whether there really were
tests? How were those tests done? What was
the rate of error in the tests? Those are the
kinds of issues that a court must look at. I
acceptance, ” tbejudge wasperbaps overly broad in bis
analysis.

















































































































































































































































































































































The Supreme Court in Daubert seems to me to have had a case like DeLuca in mind.
The court is really saying to the trial judge, it’s not that you have to be a scientist and un-
derstand what this result is, but you can at least ensure that questions get asked about how
this scientiﬁc work was actually done, before you allow an expert to express an opinion. If
the methodology was ﬂawed the expert proof must be excluded.
Second, the conclusion that comes out of Daubert is that the court recognizes that
science and law are different endeavours. If scientists are dissatisfied with the amount of
data that they have acquired, they can continue to ask questions, they can ask for another
research grant, they can continue questioning. The Supreme Court in the Daubert case rec-
ognizes that for better or worse, a court, when an issue is legally ready for determination,
must decide the question. It has no choice and the court says in Daubert,
“There are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and
the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual
revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The
scientific project is advanced by broad and wide ranging consideration of a multi—
tude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so,
and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little
use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final and binding legal judgment ——
often of great consequence —- about a particular set of events in the past. We rec-
ognize that in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flex-
ible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations.”
That is the conse—
lfscientists are dissatisfied with the amount of data that they qulencei the court 15 _5‘mPlY
gorng to have to decrde the
have acquired, they can continue to ask questions, they can ask for . .
. . . legal dispute even though it
another research grant, they can continue questioning. The Supreme does not as yet have an of the
Court in the Daubert case recognizes thatfor better or worse, 11 information
court, when an issue is legally readyfor determination, must decide
 
  
Now where does this
leave us with Daubert? I
think the judges have been
given a number of messages.
are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must re— one of the messages is that
solve disputesﬁnally and quickly ” they cannot duck responsibil—
ity in some cases where con-
‘ . troversial scientific evidence is
. being offered. They Wlll have to do their best to at least decide whether factors, such as for
instance, those shown by Glen Fox in the previous talk, were looked at by the experts. Did
‘ a they look at the consistency of results? Did they look at rates of errors? Did they have a
; theory of plausibility? Exactly what is it that they did.> And the courts will have to reject
marginal evidence at times.
the question. It has no choice and the court says in Daubert, “There
are important diyfkrences between the questfor truth in the court-
room and the questfor truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions
  
  
The court also suggests that there will be instances when scientific evidence will be
admissible but the court might still have to decide based on legal standards that it is insuffi-
cient to prove the plaintiff’5 position. The courts are obviously going to have to decide what
the legal standard is. I don’t think it’s at all clear at the moment. For example, one of the
things that the court could have done in Daubert is to have spoken about statistical signifi-
cance. It chose not to do so. Whether at some point there will be an effort to translate
legal standards into statistical terms is at this point not at all clear. Lower courts and the ,
intermediate appellate courts are obviously going to have to deal with that issue.
Finally, there have been many, many panels on Daubert since the opinion came out.
In speaking to judges, the main impression I get is that they feel that they need to know a
lot more about the scientiﬁc method. I think they will be turning to the scientific commu-
 
 nity to ﬁnd out, for instance, what are the hallmarks of a properly conducted epidemiologi-
cal study? What are problems with animal studies? How should one deal with the interre-
lationship between an animal study and an epidemiological study? Issues of causation are,
of course, not going to go away.
At bottom, the Bendectin litiga_ Finally, there have been many, many panels on Dauhert
tion probably was a relatively easy case sime the opinion came out. In speaking to judges, the main
bécause f1an 0f the CVideflCC POinth t0 1: impression I get is that theyfeel that they need to know a lot
causation m a very meanmgful war In more about the scientific method. [think they will be turn-
addition to which, and I think that this
is what ultimately impressed jurors and
judges, the defendant started doing
ing to the scientific community toﬁndout,for instance, what
are the hallmarks ofa properly conducted epidemiological
1 some very sophisticated work showing study? What areproblems with animal studies? How should
that in particular communities the rate one deal with the interrelationship between an animal study
of birth defects rCmainCd the same 136' and an epidemiological study? Issues of causation are, of
fore Bendectin was on the market. 0 course, mtgm-ng to go away.
course, it’s also true that there are lots
of other substances out there that per—
haps can cause birth defects, and none of these studies showed the courts exactly what else
was on the market at the same time that Bendectin was not and Bendectin was. But that is
the nature of the problem in these kinds of cases. So I would hope that those of you who
are scientists might have suggestions for the legal community on how to translate some of
the attempts you are making to distinguish between good science and bad science into cri—
teria that the courts can utilize.
 




For several years now my wife Sandra Jacobson and I have been doing research on a
cohort of children whose mothers ate relatively large quantities of Lake Michigan ﬁsh dur-
ing the 19705. The children were bornin 1980 and 1981 and have been studied prospec- I
 
tively from birth. We are now completing an 11—year infant followup, but the only data
that are complete and that I can talk about today are for the infant to four-year followup
phases. Because we cannot experiment on these children and randomly assign them to dif—
ferent exposure levels, the studies of course are correlational by deﬁnition. The key feature
of the correlational method that was used is the control for potential confounding variables,
that is, to control for as many inﬂuences on these developmental outcomes as possible. The
. objective was to determine the degree to which the prenatal exposure to PCBs
(polychlorinated biphenyls), which was the major contaminant in Lake Michigan ﬁsh at the
time, may have affected developmental outcomes. We were looking primarily at intellec-
tual and cognitive development, although we also looked at behavioral development and
physical growth.
 
In the 19705, Harold Humphrey of the Michigan Public Health Department had
found elevated PCB levels in blood sampled from Lake Michigan ﬁshermen and a moder—
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































saw. The children who were exposed to higher levels of PCBs were also exposed to higher
levels of dioxin and dibenzofurans, and it could be actually those contaminants, which co-
occur with PCBs in the environment, that were responsible for the effects that we saw. I
am going to talk about PCB exposure, but we probably should consider our PCB measure
as a marker for an environmental exposure, since the precise chemical composition is not
yet known.
Infants were assessed at birth, at seven months and at four years. As I said in my
introduction, the biggest problem in this kind of human correlational study, or any human
exposure study, is the risk of spurious correlation. Because subjects cannot be randomly as-
signed to control for potential confounding inﬂuences, the strategy was to measure as many
other factors as possible, known or suspected to affect the outcomes being studied and then
to control for those other inﬂuences statistically. Twenty-four potentially confounding in-
ﬂuences were included as control variables that were measured in connection with the four-
year followup study. These included prenatal exposure to alcohol, maternal smoking during
pregnancy, mother’s age, sex of infant, perinatal medical complications, mother’s IQ,
HOME Inventory, which assesses the quality of intellectual stimulation provided by the
parent, familial stress, and so forth. Since all of these could impact on the intellectual and
behavioral development of the children, they were all measured.
Our statistical strategy is based on the premise that a third variable, a possible
confounder, cannot be the true cause of an observed deficit unless it is related both to the
exposure and to the outcome. We selected control variables based on those known or sus-
pected to affect the outcome. We then controlled statistically for all the potential



















































































































































































































































































prenatal PCB exposure. '
With four-year serum PCB levels,
there was actually a positive correlation with
socio-economic status (SES). The higher
SES children have higher PCB levels at age
four. That makes PCBs very unusual because
most risk factors, such as lead and alcohol, in
our society are more concentrated in the lower
E'ven tbougb we recruited botbﬁsb eaters and non—
ﬁsb eaters in tbe sample, I [save to empbasize tbat tbe
study was not designed as a comparison between an
exposed group and a control group because everyone
in western industrial countries, sucb as ours, is going
to bave some levels quCBs in bis or ber body. Wbat





























fed longer and passed more PCBs to their
children postnatally through the breast milk.



























ﬁsb to become exposed to PCBs.










































































































































































































































































































































































































      










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 any of 17 designated subtests was considered non-cooperative. By this criterion, 7.2% of
the children were non—cooperative due to incomplete data, and their data were excluded
from the analysis. Looking at the remaining children, what we found was that prenatal
PCB exposure was associated with poorer performance on the McCarthy Verbal and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In conclusion, I would like to emphasize
We beliesue tbe data indicate diminisbed potential.
All of tbesefour-year—olds seem to be performing
witbin tbe normal range, but tbe bigber exposed
cbildren seem not to be doing as well as tbey otber—
wise would[MW in tbe absence oftbis exposure.
three points about our data. One, the defi—
cits in physical growth and short-term
memory that we have found to date were all
specifically related to prenatal exposure.
  
Even though much larger quantities of PCBs
are transferred postnatally by breast feeding,


















































































































































































































































































































































I have been quoted in the press as having said that our ﬁndings have no clinical sig—
nificance. I have said that the physical growth effects that we saw have no apparent clinical
signiﬁcance, but the short-term memory deﬁcits may be quite signiﬁcant for later cognitive
development. Relatively subtle deﬁcits in short—term memory or attention could have a
marked impact on the child’s abilityto master basic reading and arithmetic skills in school.
It is possible that subtle deﬁcits in cognitive processing ability could become magniﬁed if
the child has trouble acquiring basic skills, becomes labelled as a slow learner, and lags as a
result. Alternatively, it is conceivable that in the structure of the school environment the



















cations for the relatively subtle deficits that we have seen postnatally and at age four.
BASIS FOR REMOVING BIOLOGICALLY ACTIVE
PERSISTENT TOXIC SUBSTANCES
Dr. William Owens



























































































































































































































































































































































































implications for the river ecosystem were unknown.






































































































































































    
    
Analyses of the mill efﬂuent as process changes were implemented showed a steady
reduction in the formation of dioxin and furan. The efﬂuent has been non-detect with the
change to 100% chlorine dioxide -- with detection limits from 2—5 parts per quadrillion
since July 1992. So the process changes achieved their primary goal. Similar non-detects
for polychlorinated phenolics have been demonstrated in monthly analysis at detection lim—
its of .01 ppb.
Now let’s proceed by reviewing background information on the site and the key con-
cepts of the study design. We were fortunate to have had performed 20 years of benthic
macroinvertebrate monitoring; including a preoperational baseline. These data were impor—
tant to focusing the study effort as we will see in a minute. However, there were data gaps
on the environmental transport of efﬂuent compounds and on the health of fish species.
Baseline data are often lacking —— and every attempt should be made to find baseline data
or estimates of baseline conditions.
The analysis of the total numbers of benthic macroinvertebrates found in specific
classes showed that the pollution sensitive E-P—T (Ephemeroptera, Plecoptera, Trichoptera)
group is relatively stable at all stations, even below the mill. However, there is a rise in
oligochaetes below the municipal discharge and again below the mill. Below Bear Creek,
where surface runoff from the city of Grande Prairie enters the river, there are some addi—
tional changes. These results are consistent with an organic and nutrient enrichment pat—
tern from several sources and with no evidence for fundamental, adverse impacts —— these
data were critical to eliminate the major confounder of eutrophication impacts and allowed
us to concentrate on filling in the needed chemistry and the fisheries biology. Addressing
confounders is of critical importance in achieving a broadly accepted weight of the evidence
upon which regulators will act and the public will accept.
Our overall study design concept was to look for adverse effects and to attempt to
correlate any ﬁndings with chemical exposure. A major strength of the study is to use mul-
tiple parameters to determine both exposure and environmental effects. As you will quickly
see, our ecosystem study includes data on the discharge, water and sediments, invertebrate
and fish body burdens. We have also tested numerous biomarkers for usefulness, in addi—
tion to organismal level and fish population measures in addition to the benthic data. Thus,
a comprehensive effort was undertaken to gain a consensus from stakeholders using a weight
of the evidence basis.
The mill, located in Grande Prairie, Alberta, is on the Wapiti/Smoky River system.
The study area went to the conﬂuence with the Peace River, where the Diashowa mill had
just started operation. Previous research indicated that fish species in this environment could
be relatively mobile, so the reference area chosen was on the North Saskatchewan River sys-
tem which does not have a bleached kraft mill and is free of major industrial activity.
There are a variety of important habitat differences in the study area. The Wapiti is
fed by snow melt and glaciers in the Rockies -- it falls sharply through the foothills —-
which defines one habitat region of the river. Then in the ﬂatter agricultural and forest
lands around Grande Prairie and for about 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) below the mill, the
Wapiti forms a second habitat region. In the larger Smoky —— which runs nearly 200
kilometers (124 miles) to the Peace —— is a third habitat region, especially in regard to high
natural silt loads which affect both benthic and fish populations. Each habitat represents a
change which may affect fish populations or biomarkers, and must be recognized for proper
interpretation. Sampling sites are 1) above the municipal sewage outfall, 2) between the
sewage outfall and the mill, 3) within 5 km (3.1 miles) of the discharge, 4) from 5 km (3.1
miles) downstream of the discharge to the Smoky and 5) sites near Watino and the conflu—
ence with the Peace. Two other sites are the fish spawning areas studied: first, the longnose
sucker spawns in smaller side streams in the spring. Big Mountain Creek is a confirmed
spawning site. Second, the first confirmed mountain Whitefish spawning area to be studied
-- at Wapiti Gardens -- the mountain Whitefish is a fall broadcast spawner.
'
 The ecosystem itself presents a challenge to ﬁsh species, in addition to major tem-
perature ﬂuctuations with the ice cover during the winter and the peak ﬂow during summer
ﬂoods. A flood in 1990 was particularly extreme, but major ﬂuctuations occur annually.
This required a multi-seasonal sampling program -- with some focus on the fall low-ﬂow
events when exposure would be high -- again trying to anticipate what times were most im-
portant to achieving a sound andaccepted weight of the evidence for this site.
A variety of parameters were used to document the habitat types and to deﬁne river
regions and our reference site. Ultimately, the data showed that the reference site ﬁt the
upstream portion of Wapiti more closely than the downstream portion; a recognition neces-
sary for proper interpretation.
Chemical analyses were performed during the study with emphasis on chlorinated or—
ganics. The abiotic and the biotic compartments tested included the water column, depos-
ited and suspended sediments, benthic invertebrates, and both ﬁsh muscle and ﬁsh bile.
The fish measurements were largely on individuals, not composites -- this is necessary to
test for dose correlations between chemical body burden and the biological observations.
This was done to eliminate a prime deﬁciency in many studies: lack of exposure and dose
data, usually due to the high analytical costs involved. However, exposure is one of the most
vital aspects of ﬁeld research, as any toxicologist knows, “the dose makes the poison.”
On the biological side, various parameters were measured at the population level for
the ﬁsh community,especially for two target species: the mountain Whiteﬁsh and the
longnose sucker. As we will see, the mountain Whiteﬁsh have the greatest exposure to po-
tentially bioaccumulating compounds. Further, the population level is quite important, as
there is common agreement that adverse effects, when present, can be clearly measured at
the population level.
Tbeﬁsb measurements were largely on individuals, not com—
posites -— this is necessary to testfor dose correlations between
cbemical body burden and tbe biological observations. Tbis
was done to eliminate a prime deﬁciency in many studies:
lack cyfexfosure and dose data, usually due to tbe big/.7 analyti—
cal costs involved. However; exposure is one oftbe most vital
aspects ofﬁeld research, as any toxicologist knows, “tbe dose
makes tbepoison. ”
At the individual level, various
measures were taken for several ﬁsh
species, but again concentrating par-
ticularly on the longnose sucker and
the mountain Whiteﬁsh. Several pa-
rameters such as histology are also
widely accepted. Measurements of
reproductive capacity and success
should be central to initial environ—
mental assessments. The biomarker
tests employed during the study in- ~ »
eluded a relatively large set of measurements -- again, most often on the longnose sucker
and the mountain whiteﬁsh —— but various tests were also conducted on other species such I
 
   
 
 
as burbot and walleye. In this class of measures, it should be noted that there is far less
scientiﬁc and regulatory consensus on what constitutes an adverse effect. Therefore, inter-
pretation and use are far less clear.
 
The results, beginning at the population level and working downward, show repre-






































data. Obviously, the reference site, consistent with the habitat observations, is more of a
mountain Whiteﬁsh stream, and is a less hospitable habitat for suckers.








































data, this is an accepted indication of no adverse effect from the discharge.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































early blizzard and river freeze up prevented the capture of mountain Whiteﬁsh during an at—
tempt to evaluate their spawning run; so, climate and seasonal events often hamper data col-
lection and may confound interpretation, and all stakeholders have to appreciate the vari—
ability and difﬁculty of working in the ﬁeld.
Only one of numerous biomarkers showed a consistent difference during the study:
an inducible liver detoxiﬁcation enzyme, EROD. This is one of a large family of P450 en-
  
zymes whichbiotransform and metabolize various hydrophobic molecules. Mountain
Whitefish EROD is highly induced in a spatial relationship to the mill discharge. In con—
trast, the longnose sucker induction above background was minor.
We have examined the induction both from a chemical exposure relationship and for
any correlation to adverse biological effects. There is with the mountain Whitefish an asso—
























































































































































































































































































































' Chlorine dioxide use was accepted.
' Discussions have now begun on
lifting fish consumption advisories,
as we have demonstrated a fall in














































































































Now let’s carefully look at this ef-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































pacts on the ecosystem.
   




Fourth, there was a comprehensive assessment of the biological endpoints with built—
in redundancy —~ in many cases, parameters were deliberately designed to reiterate other
tests -- so that weight of the evidence conclusion on reproduction had the complete sup—
port of several measurements.
Finally, note the time —— three years of intensive study —- and the costs —— approach—
ing $3 million -- which are necessary to do a thorough job, just at one site. Plus the fact
that there is a continuing monitoring effort at the site. However, these costs are modest in
comparison to capital costs associated with further mill process changes, or the social and
economic costs associated with a possible mill closure were it based on assumptions that the
discharges were dangerous or causing environmental impacts.
In summary, a weight of the evidence approach is not a simple task. Considerable
effort must be spent on solid, thoroughly reviewed study designs to achieve a weight of the
evidence. Exposure validation and concurrent measurement of biological responses are part
of the comprehensive measurements needed to satisfy stakeholders. Finally, execution in
field studies is fraught with difficulty. We have encountered ﬂoods, blizzards, equipment
breakdowns, and other problems. Expectations of time, money and personnel have to be
realistic as to what can be achieved in a given time period.
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Mr. Jack Weinberg and Mr. Joe Thornton
Greenpeace Greenpeace
Chicago, Illinois New York, NY
In 1993, the Governments of the United States and Canada accepted the Interna—
tional Joint Commission’s (IJC) recommendation to use a weight of evidence approach in
reaching conclusions about proposals to eliminate persistent toxic substances from the eco-
system. The IJC introduced this concept as part of its call for a precautionary set of envi-
ronmental policies, including the use of the “reverse onus” approach to chemical regulations.
The IJC and governments must now more fully define the use and meaning of the term
“weight of evidence approach” as it is used in this context. We would like to share some
thoughts on the use of a “weight of evidence” approach for evaluating scientific information
in a precautionary policy setting.
Science and Policy
Few scientists would claim that science can establish final or ultimate truths. Rather,
science is a method and practice for seeking truth through aniterative process of formulat—
ing, testing and revising theories and hypotheses. In a scientific setting, a practitioner seeks
evidence in order to strengthen or disprove a hypothesis she or he is actively testing. This
effort is part of a larger exercise inthe construction of a body of human knowledge.
Science and the knowledge it produces shouldinform public policy. On the other
hand, only in highly authoritarian societies do decisionmakers claim that public policy can
or should be derived entirely from science; in those societies, these claims serve primarily to
mystify and conceal. In democratic societies, we acknowledge that policy incorporates not
only scientiﬁc inputs but also considerations of ethics, values and opinions, as well as the
 
 interplay of conﬂicting interests and perspectives.
In deﬁning a “weight of evidence” or “precautionary” approach to environmental
policy, the proper role of science is to generate theories and evidence, to suggest how these
can inform public policy, and to evaluate the validity and relevance of cited scientific infor—
mation to the policy matter under consideration.
When good science informs policy, it increases the likelihood of a match between the
policy’s stated goal and the actual outcome that occurs when the policy is put into practice.
Conversely, when policy consistently fails to achieve its stated goals, this calls into question
the policy’s intellectual and scientific underpinnings.
Current contamination of the Great Lakes suggests a failure in past environmental
policy, a failure that was aided and abetted by limitations or failures in the science that in—
formed that policy. The time has come to re—evaluate theories and concepts such as “as-
similative capacity” and “safe threshold levels,” particularly as applied to toxic substances
that persist and/or bioaccumulate in the environment.
It is also time to re—evaluate policymaking methodologies that are based on these con-
ceptions of “assimilable capacity” and “acceptable harm” —- particularly risk assessment and
risk/beneﬁt analysis. As currently practised, these exercises never provide a meaningful pre-
diction of real risks or real benefits. The simplified, narrow models used to “quantify” health
and environmental threats bear little resemblance to the complex and unpredictable phe—
nomena that occur when chemical mixtures enter integrated natural systems.
Where data is sparse or harms unanticipated, risk assessments are blind; potential in—
juries that are poorly understood, difficult to quantify, or simply excluded from the model,
never appear in the results. A lack of data serves as evidence of safety. On the “cost” side,
the availability of alternatives and the broad social and economic benefits of protective ac-
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political inﬂuences that determine those servesasevidence afsafety.
choices. Thus, exercises in risk assess-
ment can become pseudoscientiﬁc arti-


























































































































































































































l cent comes at a cost to society: namely, many instances where individuals who perpetrate
criminal acts will go free. We decided, however, that the overriding public interest is to
protect the law-abiding citizen from civil authority and thereby prevent the abuse of power,




On the other hand, our society uses a different standard of proof in judging, for ex—
ample, the outcome of a lawsuit involving conﬂicting interpretations of the implications of
a contract between two equal parties. If there is a difference of opinion on the facts, deter-
mination is made by a “preponderance of evidence.” Neither side has a special burden of
proof to overcome. There is parity between the parties and the decision favors the evidence
that is most persuasive.
The societal decision to establish a particular standard of proof in some sphere of con-
cern reﬂects a societal value judgment about that sphere of concern. The standard chosen
reﬂects a judgment about the appropriate way to make decisions that impact that sphere of
concern under circumstances when the data is incomplete and there is uncertainty.
When the data base is rich and the level of certainty about cause and effect linkages
is high, virtually any standard of proof will yield the same result. The greater the uncer—
tainty, however, the greater is the likelihood that a mistaken inference will occur. Under
such conditions, the actual outcome is as likely to be inﬂuenced by the standard of proof in
use, as by the data and the evidence. A precautionary standard reﬂects a societal decision
to tilt the balance toward mistakes of one type over those of another.
 
Precautionary Standard
Precautionary standards are a normal part of everyday life. Common sense dictates
that there must always be a relationship between the amount of caution to be exercised, the
magnitude of potential for harm, and the degree of uncertainty in predicting outcomes.
Consider,for example, aparent attempting to determine , conSlder’ for gample’ a parent at—
temptmg to determine how much free-
bo'w mucbﬁ‘eedom ofaction to give a cbild. Tbe start— dom of action to give a Child The start_
ingPOint i5 tb‘POtentialﬁ” Signiﬁcant barm' [ft/’3 ing point is the potential for significant
child is balancing on tbe ledge ofa tent]; story window, harm_ If the Child is balancing on the
theprudent parent will takepreventive action, wen be— ledge of a tenth story window, the pru—
fore concluding that tbe cbildis certain tofall. dent Pare“t Will take PreventiVe action,
even before concluding that the child is
w v v v certain to fall. If, on the other hand, the
child 18 playing on a Similar ledge four feet off the ground, a more relaxed attitude may be
a appropriate and the exercise might serve as a learning experience for both parent and child.
 
  
   
  
A loving parent will take action if there is potential for the child to be killed, but can
be much more relaxed if the likely danger is a bruise or a scratch. In neither case does the
parent want to see the child hurt —- but the potential for significant harm is key to deter-
mining the amount of caution and therefore, the appropriate course of action.
Another example was suggested by a friend who teaches medicine. A patient checks
into the hospital on Friday night with symptoms of pneumonia. Based on an examination of
the symptoms, the physician reaches a professional judgment that there is an 85% chance the
disease is pneumonia and a 15% chance that the patient is suffering from Legionnaires’ disease.
The physician must now decide which medicine to prescribe. Medicine A is very ef-
fective for treating pneumonia but is quite ineffective in treating Legionnaires’ disease. If,
however, medicine A is prescribed and the correct diagnosis is Legionnaires’ disease, by
Monday morning the patient will probably be dead.
 Medicine B, on the other hand, is fairly effective in treating common pneumonia, but
it is not as effective as A. Medicine B, however, also works for Legionnaires’ disease, and
lacks significant side effects.
Simply weighing the evidence might tell the physician to prescribe medicine A.
Eighty-five times out of 100, this would be the right choice. A physician who does so,
however, makes an error and will lose the patient 15% of the time. The consequences of a
wrong choice are not identical for each outcome. Good medical practice thus requires pre-
cautionary decisionmaking.
Weighing evidence in order to decide upon a course of action under circumstances of
uncertainty is not a value—neutral exercise. The loving parent does not conclude, “Odds are
that the kid won’t fall.” The prudent physician does not decide, “Statistical considerations
favor a diagnosis of pneumonia.”
Precaution must be built into the rules of inference. The goal is not to determine
which description of the world is most probably correct. The goal, rather, is to make infer-
ences that can inform a course of action that will minimize the likelihood of significant
harm. When the harm is large, the uncertainty is great, and our ability to predict the fu-
ture is limited, we adopt a precautionary standard to judgment and inference.
Reverse Onus
In a criminal law case, as expressed above, a defendant is presumed innocent, the bur-
den of proof is on the state, and the jury is instructed to reach a guilty verdict only if, after
weighing all the evidence, it concludes the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a moral certainty.
By confused logic, North American
policymakers have extended these civil
liberties from people to chemicals. With-
out thoughtful consideration, society has
taken upon itself the burden to prove that
a particular chemical, a class of chemicals
or pollution from a particular industrial
process harms health or the environment.
In the absence of such deﬁnitive proof,
In a criminal law care, a defendant is presumed inno—
cent, tbe burden ofprocf is on tbe state, and tbejury is
instructed to reacb a guilty verdict only after weigb-
ing all tbe evidence, it concludes tbe defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty . . .
by confused logic, North American policymakers bave
extended tbese civil libertiesﬁompeople to cbemicals.
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In recent years, there has been growing recognition of the potential size, scope and
duration of damage to ecosystems and health that can be caused by the production, use and
discharge of synthetic chemicals into the ecosystem. We are learning that:
1. Environmental damage can be widespread and severe before the injury and its com—
plex of causes have been clearly identiﬁed;
2. Even after injurious practices are discontinued, environmental damage can persist for
long periods and even continue to intensify;
3. The potential for harm is unbounded and can threaten even the integrity of the hu—
man species and its ability to reproduce.
As a result of this growing understanding of the significance and unpredictability of
the injury that synthetic chemicals may cause to the ecosystem, “precaution” has become a
byword of environmental policy. This concept was first introduced into international law in
the “Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of
the North Sea” in 1987.
The Ministers of the Contracting Parties had agreed to address “polluting emissions
of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate, at source.” Their ap-
proach, often called the “precautionary principle,” states that action should be taken:
“When there is reason to assume that certain damage or harmful effects on the
living resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even where
there is no scientiﬁc evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.”
Some argue that the IJCfs “weight of evidence approach” is
weaker than the “precautionaryprinciple.” This interpretation is
false, however, and in sharp conﬂict with the IjC’s usage. The
weight ofevidence approach does not simply involve weighing
positive against negative or inconclusive evidence according to
traditional standards ofproof The Commission, rather, has
calledprecaution the “basic underpinning”oftheir strategy.
   
  
  
Some argue that the UC’s
“weight of evidence approach” is
weaker than the “precautionary
principle.” This interpretation is ‘
false, however, and in sharp con—
ﬂict with the lJC’s usage. The
weight of evidence approach does
not simply involve weighing posi—
   
 
  
tive against negative or inconclu-
. H . . . . .. .. . sive evidence according to tradi—
tional standards of proof. The Commission, rather, has called precaution the “basic under—
pinning" of their strategy. The use of a precautionary context changes both the purpose and
the practice of weighing evidence. The issue now being explored is the development of a
methodology for weighing evidence in a precautionary framework -- or what might be
called “precautionary inference.”
Precautionary Inference
Two of the most important applications of the precautionary principle are zero dis-
. charge for persistent toxic substances and reverse onus for synthetic chemicals.
Even after these principles are adopted, however, weighing evidence in a precaution-
ary framework is still required. There will be policy decisions to make, and these will be
based in part on scientiﬁc information that remains, as always, incomplete, inconclusive, or
indeterminate. There must be some method of evaluating evidence that is consistent with a
precautionary standard. This method can be termed precautionary inference.
 Precautionary inference provides a method for making scientiﬁc judgments based on
incomplete, inconclusive orindeterminate data in a field in which signiﬁcant harm may oc-
cur from a false negative judgment. Unlike the current scientiﬁc and policy framework, this
approach reverses the burden of proof, framing the question with the null hypothesis:
“What evidence must we IGNORE to conclude that a causal relationship does not exist?”
For example, policymakers must rely on scientiﬁc evidence to guide decisions con—
cerning which chemicals and/or classes of chemicals should be classiﬁed as persistent toxic
substances under the terms of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and thus subject
to virtual elimination and zero discharge.(1)
The starting points for such an evaluation are the deﬁnitions of toxicity and persist-































































































































































































thetic chemicals now in commerce,
precautionary inference is necessary
to decide which chemicals may
reasonably be presumed to be per-
sistent toxic substances. For ethi—
cal, practical, engineering and eco—
logical reasons, the IJC has con—
cluded that attempts to regulate
Since little or no data are available for the majority ofthe
80,000 synthetic chemicals now in commerce, precautionary
inference is necessary to decide which chemicals may reason—
ably he presumed to hepersistent toxic substances. For ethical,




















- chemicals one-by—one are doomed
to failure, so the focus for environ-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eration ofan integrated body ofdirect and circumstantial evidence.



















would result in significant
harm and when there is un-
certainty in our predictive
ability.
The burden of proof
rests on the producer and/or
user of the chemical(s).
Shifting the burden of proof
  
from society to those who ad-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































you know when the community health is different, i.e. “not normal”? What do you com-
pare with? This research was undertaken during the 19705 and completed in about 1978.
It was supposed to become part of the 1980 US. census. It would have been a sub-study
and it would have been administered randomly, covering the whole United States and pro-
viding a common basis for comparison. We would have had some way to compare
regionally and it would have been very useful. No one really knew about this report except
for the 200 people working on it. It was voted down in Congress and the booklet, which is
still good and useful, is totally out of print. I have a copy and if anyone wants it, I will
photocopy it. It is useful, it is helpful, and we need to start asking some of these questions
routinely. Systematically collecting data would be one way of applying Hill's criteria to the
complicated reality of the 1990s.
However, I think we also have to remember that we need to improve on Hill’s crite—
ria of causality. It was a ﬁrst cut. It is not the last answer and I think that, given our expe-
rience of the last 20—30 years, we need to add some criteria to it.
One of the Hill’s criteria for causality refers to statistical significance of the ﬁnding.
Here you are trying to prevent rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, called a type I
error. The null hypothesis is that there is no connection between the toxicant and the ill—
ness. Scientists protect the null hypothesis at a 5% level or a 1% level. That means one
accepts the null hypothesis unless the outcome was so unusual that it could not have hap—
pened by chance more than 5% or 1% of the time. We need to expand Hill’s criteria and
note the power of the test. The power of the test measures the type II error. I think that a
lot of poor science has gone on, producing a very large number of studies that show noth—
ing. Just because a study shows nothing does not mean there is nothing happening. I would
tell you I know lots of ways to design studies so that no relationship between exposure and
illness shows. Anybody can do that. It takes a little more skill to design a study where
some relationship does show. What you need to know is the power of the test or the prob—
ability that you will accept that null hypothesis as true when it is wrong. Every study
should report its power. It is
It takes a little more skill to design a study where some relation—
.. ship does show. Whatyou need to know is thepower ofthe test
’5 ' or theprobability thatyou will acceptthat null hypothesis as true
when it is wrong. Every study should report its power. It is
rarely reported. By being more demandingthat a typeIerror not
rarely reported. By being more de—
manding that a type I error not oc—
cur we increase the risk of making
a type II error.
I think the other problem
that we have is that the Hill crite—
oecur we increase the risk ofmaking a type II error.
  
ria were based on a linear system,
not an ecosystem approach. When
you have competing causes of death you cannot expect a linear dose-response. One of the
most obvious examples of this is looking for dose-response with respect to cancer deaths in
an area where you have low socio—economic status or a third world situation, where the per-
son is more than likely to die during the pre—cancerous, infectious disease phase than of can—
cer. You are not going to get the same dose—response when you have competing causes of
death. You have to have a wider and broader approach to health than a particular criterion
expecting a dose-response, which is always responsive to the same degree under all circum—
stances.
I think there are other problems with Hill's criteria, which are brought up nicely in
the Jacobson study (p. 9-15), in which the dose—response factor can also depend on the
point in the life cycle at which the exposure occurs. You might not get a dose response with
the breast milk but you do get the dose response with in utero exposure. You have to know
the point at the life cycle that the exposure elicits a biological response. There are, for ex—
ample, exposures which affect the thyroid gland. A fetal thyroid gland develops around the
ﬁfth month, so you ﬁnd a difference in fetal exposure before the ﬁfth month and after the
ﬁfth month. The same is true with any other organ system that is forming. So timing in
the life cycle is important.
Sometimes the toxic effect is in the offspring of the exposed person. I think we are
becoming more and more aware of the effect which Einstein, who was one of the most
forthright proponents of nuclear technology, pointed out and that is the subtle
intergenerational loss of intelligence in the community exposed to radiochemical pollution.
If we start damaging brains, we are going to have reduction in IQl general reduction in
population intelligence, and that moves me to what the famous geneticist, Muller, pointed
out: namely, the loss of vigour in the species. When the species starts losing vigour, you
are on a species death path or route. We have to pay more attention, not only to the long—
term effect in the individual, but to the long—term effects on the species. I think that as we
move into more and more subtle damage to the living system, it is going to be the
intergenerational effects that will become prominent.
Hill was primarily concerned with severe observable health damage in an exposed
person. As a medical researcher, I am concerned not about choosing severe end-points like
cancer death, but rather I am anxious to identify biomarkers at the point where the situa—
tion is reversible. That means a radical change in research orientation. It‘means looking at
biological end-points that are less dramatic than cancer or genetic damage. I would just
point out here that once you start an intergenerational loss of vigour, you are in an irrevers-
ible pattern. The same thing relates to our fixation with looking at cancer death, which is
certainly a severe end-point. However, if there is excess cancer death it means that you have
been doing the wrong thing for some 30—40 years, and the process at that point is irrevers-
ible. One of the things that we have to do is to start looking at earlier bioindicators of de-
teriorating physical well—being and of early signsof deteriorating vigour in the species which
might serve as early warnings of
trouble. We have done some work Sometimes tbe toxic ﬁct is in tbe oﬁfspring oft/1e exposedper—
0“ thls aPPrOaCh and 1t ‘5 POSS‘ble' son. I tbink we are becoming more and more aware oftbe eﬂect
However suCh an approaCh de- wbicb Einstein, wbo was one oftbe mostfortbrigbt proponents
mands that one not wait for defini- . .
ﬁve conﬁrmation of causality It is of nuclear tecbnology, pointed out and that is tbe subtle
better to demonstrate probable intergenerational loss ofintelligence in tbe community exposed
causality by an intervention to im— to radiocbemicalpollution. Ifwe start damaging brains, we are
PIOVC health- Weight 0f CVianCC going to bare reduction in IQ, general reduction in population
calls. for intervention When causality intelligence, and tbat moves me to wbat tbefamous geneticist,
is expected to be conﬁrmed, if the
deteriorating situation is allowed to
go to its logical conclusion.
Muller, pointed out: namely, tbe loss ofvigour in tbe species.
Wben tbe species starts losing vigour, you are on a species deatb
pat/.7 or route.
  
Another problem with the g I V g
Hill criteria, given our present level ' 1 s ' ' ' I
of pollution, is that it basically assumes that you have a normal healthy population with i
which to begin. They are exposed to something toxic and there is an ill effect. We have a
  
been exposed to a growing number of toxic radionuclides and toxic chemical materials at an
escalating rate for the last 40-50 years and I think we have developed highly susceptible
sub-populations. I am thinking of some of the multiple chemically-sensitive people. There
are also other problems in our society which demonstrate a worsening of the host response.
Whenever you have a hazard, you have pathways to people and then you have the response
of the person. v
 
The responses of people have also changed. One can’t just look at the hazard and the
pathways and think of the responses as automatic. The population is not homogeneous. I
am thinking of some of the problems which bother me very much, like AIDS. AIDS is a
virus which, by its evolutionary composition, is rather an old virus. It has been around a
long time. Formerly it was observed as a terminal disease in those over 70. What is differ—
ent in our time is that it is showing up in people in the 205 and 30s and that was not seen
before. But what it says to me is that something has changed in the host response. I think
there are other examples of this and we need to look more closely at host response variants.
  
   
  
  
I think there are ethical questions underlying decisions with respect to pollution.
What to do about these problems is not yet clear and sometimes you have to make a judg-
ment call. I would see some differences, for example, where the citizens have a choice. If
you have a choice of avoiding a hazard it seems to me different from a hazard which is in
your air and which you really can’t refuse to breathe. You might not be able to move your
residence. There is an element you have to look at when making judgments and that is the
individual’s ability to avoid the exposure.
I would like to make some suggestions for further reﬂection. I really think we have
to ﬂesh out more clearly what we mean by a weight of evidence approach: how broad it
should be; and what it needs to consider. I have recommendations in three categories to be
studied. One is with respect to the hazards. The second one is with respect to the path—
ways, and the third is with respect to the host response that I think could form the basis of
a new approach.
With respect to the bazard: I think the burden of proof, at least on many important
questions, needs to be a reverse onus. There should be a need to prove something is not
damaging before it is used, and the burden of proof should notbe on the victim to say a
toxicant is connected with a health problem. I think there are some very good models for
- testing of pharmaceuticals that could be used in this respect to screen chemicals before they
are put into the environment. I would also recommend establishing a health review board
that would be at arm’s length from industry and government, that would review new
projects. Our environmental assessments do not include human health. They are very su—
perficial in that regard and I would call for a health assessment of every major new project.
I think we can also recognize science advocacy as legitimate. Scientists are always
trying to say that they are purely objective, but it is not really true. It is impossible to avoid
choices such as what to research, how to design a study, what related research is “credible,”
etc. I think we should be more honest and forthright. I would recommend two ways of
dealing with this: one would be some type of a science court where there could be at least a
clarification of the issues. I also participated in a good system the Germans thought up
when they were trying to deal with the Kalkar breeder reactor which was on the border be-
tween Holland and Germany. If there was an accident it would be an international affair.
They were trying to make an estimate of the extent of nine accident scenarios. What they
did is put out calls for a grant proposal for estimating the health effects of these nine acci-
dents and they gave out two contracts, one to people who were proponents of the reactor,
and one to people who were opponents of the reactor. Both groups were given exactly the
same baseline data, they were given access to the same computer programs and software,
and they were told to come up with the estimates of the number of health effects for each
of these nine accidents. The study was mandated by the Bundestag. It was an excellent
process and clarified a lot. The predicted numbers of casualties ended up different, but we
could explain exactly why they were different, where the decisions had been made, what
things were scientific and what estimates were judgment calls. I think more of that type of
assessment would help.
I would also recommend that we move from the relative risk statistic to a little more
sophisticated one which is called the “attributable proportion.” It is a derivative statistic.
There has been a lot of development of this statistic within the last five to seven years. It was
ﬁrst proposed about 1970. The attributable proportion is a statistical quantity which would
let you estimate, for example, what proportion of lung cancers are due to a particular expo—
sure. You might say 17% are due to smoking and 2% are due to radon gas, and so on. You can
begin to attribute proportions. That gives you an upper limit for the possibility of improve-
ment. In other words, if only 20% of the cases are connected with an exposure, then your
massive program to reduce that exposure can at best give you 20% improvement in a health
statistic. It tells you where to put your public health effort, for one thing. Attributable pro-
portion can be estimated now in stratified samples, for example age specific. It is quite a
sophisticated technology which is available to us and which I think we should start using.
 
 I would also move
into such things as proportional compensation.
This addresses
some of the legal issues. Compensation for injury for workers, or a law suit for the public,
is usually all or nothing. You win or lose in this situation. I think we could begin to deal
with it in a much more sensible fashion if we used attributable proportion. If we said 20%
of the cases are due to this exposure, then 20% of all health cost for this illness would be
covered. There will be resistance to this on the part of the public, but I think we need to
move out of the deadlock situation and find new ways of dealing with compensation. Life-
style choices could enter into the funding of medical care. If 17% of the lung cancers were
due to smoking, and you chose to smoke, maybe you should pick up 17% of your health
related costs. There are possibilities here. I am not saying those are perfect answers but I
am trying to open up a future where we can dialogue and we can find a better way to deal
with the problems than in the past.
I have found it particularly hard to deal in the legal framework where basically you
have to double the incidence of disease to meet the legal standards of probable cause. You
can say it is more probable that the disease is caused by the exposure, than that it was caused
by something else if the disease rate is more than doubled. To fulﬁll this requirement in
law, an industry has to suddenly double the occurrence of some disease through its pollution
or there is no compensation. That is an irrational kind of criteria and puts a scientist in a
terrible position. It also implies you can keep increasing gradually the levels, say of cancer
or birth defects, and would never be legally responsible for causing the problems. It is a
difﬁcult area. We certainly need an interdisciplinary approach and we need some creative
ideas on how to handle decisions. I would look forward to working with people over the





   
With respect to the second
area, namely patbways, we need to
investigate biochemical changes af—
ter the pollutant is released. For
example, cobalt 60 was ignored as a
milk contaminant during the nu-
clear fallout period because the
body has a short residency period
for inorganic cobalt. In the field,
however, inorganic cobalt was in—
corporated into Vitamin B12 in the
cow’s rumen. This has a much
longer residency period in the body
and is stored in liver. Incorporation * '
into the food chain may also be a slow process. The United Nations estimates that carbon
14 will have its maximum public health impact 150 years after release to the environment. a
Ibaveﬁund itparticularly bard to deal in tbe legalframework
wbere basically you ba've to double tbe incidence ofdisease to
meet tbe legal standards ofprobable cause. You can say it is
more probable tbat tbe disease is caused by tbe exposure, tban
tbat it was caused by sometbing else the disease rate is more
tban doubled. T‘Oﬁllﬁll tbis requirement in law, an industry
bas to suddenly double tbe occurrence ofsome disease tbrougb its
pollution or tbere is no compensation. Tbat is an irrational
kind ofcriteria andputs a scientist in a terribleposition.
 
Sometimes the toxic material is not released but its precursor is released.
 
The third area which needs broadening in the weight of evidence approach has to do
with bost response. This might include past health history of a community, other toxic expo-
sures, differential protection for pregnant women or persons with multiple chemical sensi—
tivities. Protection may relate to age, sex, life cycle, occupation, ethnic background or other
pertinent factors.
Hopefully these complex issues, which are of serious import, can be discussed in an
open and constructive dialogue involving industry, scientists, government, human rights pro—
ponents, ethicists and the interested public.
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































dioxins to show up as changes in the environment?




















virtual elimination and their inability to achieve that end
through regulation alone. We believed that ratcheting down the
allowable discharges, for example of the 11 critical substances
listed by the Water Quality Board, would never getyou to vir—
tual elimination and thatfor these unnatural compounds there
has to be zero human input.
of the levels of dioxins in fish,
dioxins have a half-life of about six
months. As we started to ratchet
down the efﬂuent we would start
to see changes the following spring
and they would continue to de—
cline. Pulp and paper efﬂuents are
extremely complex mixtures of
  
chemicals and the first question to
ask is whether there were any

























































































































































































































































 Saulius Simoliunas: Professor Berger said that now the court will recognize that there
are two proofs, one scientiﬁc proof, one legal proof. I hope that there will be some Su-
preme Court judge to explain that, because to me it does not make too much sense.
Wayne Schmidt: I work for the National Wildlife Federation and we are one of the
groups that place great reliance on Joe and Sandra Jacobson’s research because of its impor-
tance in the policy—making arena. What is your reaction to the criticism of your research,































































































































































































































































































































we had this serious toxicological
problem in the Great Lakes. Pub—
lic health should be about taking
the proverbial handle off the pump
and stopping the cholera outbreak.
There will be costs, there will be
risks and possibly mistakes and

















































































































ing about the health of future gen-
erations and about the ecosphere.
For many substances we cannot do
the kinds of studies being advo-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When one pesticide is ﬁnally forced
Wbat will bappen wben tbe next kind oflesion or syndrome
occurs? Will we be able to respond any quicker to investigate
it or to control tbe substance tbat caused it?
That is wbere I come back to biological monitoring ofour eco—
systems. Wbat was needed at tbe time was a system network
tbat could indicate wbetber or not the waters and bird colo—
nies were all rig/st. Tbere seemed to be insuﬂicient resources
or an information network to build on tbe initial observa-
tions in colonies in tbe Toronto and Hamilton area. Tbere
was an insuﬂicient mass ofevidence to getpeoples’attention.
off the market because of the injury
to the health of farm workers, a new
one is substituted. I am also con-
cerned about the ethics of research-
ers, educators and funding organiza-
tions. For example, there are scien—
tists who apply for grants agusing the
jargon of the funding agency, but in—
stead undertake the studies that are
of interest to them. Politics are used
to inﬂuence what gets funded and
how the information is released and
  
‘ISCd, and there are examples of in—














































































































































































































































































has been the policy of the Canadian and United States Governments since the signing of
the revised Agreement in 1978. Through the Virtual Elimination Task Force and a series
of roundtable discussions involving industry, environmental groups, and scientists and regu-
lators, we arrived at the conclusion that the policy was unattainable through regulation
alone. We recommended that for those substances that were so onerus that society cannot
tolerate them, there must be some date, whether it is five years, 10 years, or even 50 years,
when the substances will no longer be brought into existence. We reviewed the list of 11
critical pollutants set out by the Water Quality Board. The majority of them are chlorin—
ated organics, which then raised the question of how do you deal with chlorinated organics,
where the evidence indicates they are harmful, without dealing with chlorine itself.
Robert Schubring: Chlorine is essential to the manufacture of items critical for na—
tional defense, such as silicone for micro chips and titanium for aircraft turbine blades, and
for the manufacture of platinum catalytic converters for air pollution control on automo-
biles. Our concern is how do you get from 11 toxic substances in the Great Lakes, that
your body has a mandate to oversee, to something that has absolutely no relevance to that
whatsoever?
Gordon Durnil: That is your conclusion, not mine. We recommended that indus—
try had to be involved in setting a timetable, so that there was no social or economic dis-
ruption.
John Mahan: A large
part of society believes that if we
can get enough science and technol-
ogy we can solve the problem. Sci-
ence is a system of inquiry. It is not
a system of answers or of
decisionmaking. No matter how
much science we have, there is al-
ways more science we will want and
need and we will never have all the
answers, but decisionmaking comes
through judgment, wisdom and eth-
ics. Science is a tool, not a solution.
And so we need to use the best sci—
ence we can, but we’ve got to go be-
yond that and be guided by ethics.























A large part ofsociety believes that we can get enough science
and technology we can solve theproblem. Science is a system of
inquiry. It is not a system ofanswers or ofdecisionmahing. No
matter how much science we have, there is always more science
we will want and need and we will never have all the answers,
but decisionmahing comes through judgment, wisdom and eth-
ics. Science is a tool, not a solution. And so we need to use the
best science we can, but we’ve got to go beyond that and be
guided by ethics.
It seems that there are no easy answers in these complex issues,
since it is diﬂicult to make policy decisions to protect an ecosystem
or a sensitive species when there will be eﬂécts on the socioeco—




















































































































































































































































the needs of workers affected by these decisions.
   
ll AnnJarrell: I think that we need to focus on how policy makers make decisions
since this is not studied enough. As a scientist working for the Health Standards Division
of the Occupational Safety and Health Association, I developed a scientific record which
was reviewed, but the decision was taken out of my hands and made at the political level.
Whatever exposure level was set would not necessarily coincide with my recommendation.
Gordon Durnil: The scientiﬁc community often forgets that communication from
one level to the next level is a critical element. Whether scientists are trying to communicate to
a congressman or member ofparliament or a CEO, there needs to be clear communication even
though this can be a very difficult thing to do effectively with technically complex material.
Unidentiﬁed: We need a way of determining the economic feasibility of many of
these chemicals and of their alternatives. Companies beneﬁt from the products, but it is
the citizens who must find the resources to ﬁght these chemicals. I prefer a reverse onus
model in which the 15,000 organochlorine chemicals would be banned and, if a company
wants one particular organochlorine substance, let the company undertake the studies to
prove the safety of the chemical. When the results are completed, they should be made
available to citizens who may wish to argue about the safety in an open forum.
Glen Fox: I am concerned that the economists are not developing the science
of economics to deal with environmental issues, or if they have, it is not widely used. As a
regulator, I have sometimes come to the conclusion that a product was ecologically danger-
ous. But in preparing a risk—benefit or a cost—benefit analysis, the environment always ends
up looking as though it has no value.
Rosalie Bertell: In the preparation of the Ontario Hydro 25-year plan, we investi-
gated the human health costs of each of the different ways of producing electricity. In es—
sence, because the province ends
We need a way ofdetermining tbe economicfeasibility ofmany up paying 311 the health costs,
offbese chemicals and of tbeir alternatives. Companies benqit these do not enter into either the
ﬁom tbe products, but it is tbe citizens who mustﬁnd tbe re— 355§5§m6m hearing 01’ t0 the
sources toﬁgbt tbese cbemicals. Iprefer a reverse onus model in d,eC15101nmak1n%' great“? a
. . . - 11‘
wine]: tbe15,000 organocblorzne cbemzcals would be banned SIX V0 “me su mlssmn t at l
d , , l , eluded estimates of the external-
an , zfa company wants one particu ar organocblorme sub— ized costs to the province or to
stance, let tbe company undertake tbe studies to prove tbe safety society
oftbe cbemical.
. Gordon Durnil: Yesterday,
David Crombie commented on
changing our ways of thinking and the interdependency of economic health with environ-
mental health. For example, when we talk about relative risk, are we going to accept that it
a does not apply to minorities who need a free source of food such as the catfish from the
  
Detroit River? We watch the dissatisfaction of voters in our two countries primarily elect-
ing people they do not want, because they do not want who they have.
 
Unidentiﬁed: There seems to be an analogy between how some people are super-
sensitive to chemicals because of the general degradation of our general health, and the viru-
lence ofzebra mussels and other exotic species in already weakened ecosystems. I should like to
see more emphasis on the teaching of the scientiﬁc method. This would produce more inde-
pendent thinkers willing to explore alternative hypotheses and might inspire better solutions
from less authoritarian types of personality structures.
Jack Weinberg: As we approach the next millenium, humankind is facing issues
that we never faced before because, in the past 50 years, we have obtained the capacity to
disrupt ecosystems on a global scale rather than, as previously, on a local or regional scale.
The conservation ethic has helped us to start putting a value on species and on the value of
natural beauty. But if we do not note what is happening to nature as a result of human
 
 ‘—i—i
action and callously place no value on what we are losing, then we are jeopardizing our own
survival as a species.
Gordon Durnil: Inthe next two years, the Commission will be wrestling with the
subject of weight of evidence as one of our priorities. I would like Brad Leinhart, Jack
Weinberg, Rosalie Bertell, and Glen Fox to write what they think we should be doing on
this topic in as productive a way as possible, and send it to Mike Gilbertson at the Regional
Ofﬁce. I want to thank you all for coming to this workshop. It has been most enlightening
to me and I really appreciate it.
  
